

The summaries of the Enery, Friendly, and Aviation Operations in KOREA
 'during the week of 16 April - 23 April 1953 are attached.
thes (3)
CG FMrlant (3)
*CG FMFPAC (1)
CG AIRFMFLARNT (3)
"CG ATRFMFPAC (3)
CG 2DMARDIV (3)
\#CG 3DMARDIV (3)
CG SDHAR: (3)
CG 3DMAV (3)

* cg marbaks campen (3)

CG MARBAKS CAMIEJ (3)
CG FORTRPS FMFLANT (3)
*CG FMIPPACIRPS (3)
*G FORTRPS FMFPAC (3)
Dir MCEC MCS (3)
CG MARCORCRUITDEPOT PARRIS ISLAND (3)
*CG MARCORCRUITDIEPOT SANT DIEGO (3)
*COMARAIRRESTRACmd, NAS GLENVIEM, ILJ (1)
*CG TMU PAC (1)
CG THU LANT (3)
Divavn (1)
ACors , G-2 (1)

* Via Air Mail


AO-2C-2012-bd $003 A 11353$

Eneny air forces bare out in strength on only two days of the
 th weathes. The reason for low activisy on the remaining two days $t 3$ unknown she total number of $30 r t 1 e s$ :were 235 . with 81 engagementr: 8 dectroyed mad 6. imaped. Fhis wexesente mbout hale the extort of the previcus heek. Un the night on 14 april a Mavy P-2V on an ECPM rilsaion in the Sea of Japan at latitude 43-07N. longitude $235-40 \mathrm{E}$ was picked up and followed by an unidentified aiporafe. The p-ct continued on course 245 for approximately 170 miles with the unidentified aircraft staying approximately 12 miles astern. At this second position the unidentified aircraft was joined by a minimum total of 10 airerafit. The weather was CAVU, but the night was extremely dark. The P-2V headed for home base and descended to 400 peet altitude. The unidentifled alreraft made at least 70 aggressive non-firing passes, mostly from astern, all passing underneath the P-2V at 400 feet. At least 10 passes were made by 4 planes in formation, with runs from astern, Radar emissions from one of the unidentified aircraft picked up by the $P-2 V$ indicate the possibjility that one of the unidentified alreraft was using radar to position and control the other aiperaft for their attacks. No recognition features of the unidentified aircrait wers observed other than an occasional jet glow. This incident indicates an increased capability of Soviet interceptors.

Disposition and aubordination of Communist combat airczaft in china and Manchuria are shown on the following chart. For the pirgt 36 months of the Korean War Communst forees have made a continuing attempt to increase their defensive alr capabilities. Since 1 October 1952, however, the trend changed when some 50 TU-2 conventional light bombers and 100 IL-28 light jet bopber's appeared in the area. The Communists have indicated a derinite desire to strike at un air bases from which our air attacks are launched.

## COKBAP AIRCRAFT

|  | LOCATION |  | SUBOPDINATION |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | CHINA | MAN | CCAP | MKAF |  |
| Fighters | 40 | 200 | 120 | 80 | 40 |
| Jet Fighters | 400 | 1,000 | 925 | 75 | 400 |
| Ground Attack | 80 | 120 | 160 | 40 | - - |
| Bombers | 200 | 40 | 240 | - - | - - |
| Jet Bombers | - | 100 | 60 | 40 | - - |
| TOTAL: | 720 | 1,460 | 1.505 | 235 | 440 |
| GRAND TOTAL: |  |  |  |  |  |

It will be noted from the chart that the majority of the MIG-15 jet fighters are located in Manchuria and that all of the light jet bombers are located in Manchuria. In addition to the 2,180


