


B (A03H-Jmb) (A03A11353)

The summaries of the Enemy, Friendly, and Aviation Operations in KOREA during the week of 16 April - 23 April 1953 are attached.

2383

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DISTRIBUTION
≥ MCS (3)
CG FMFLANT (3)
*CG FMFPAC (1)
CG AIRFMFLANT (3)
CG AIRFMFPAC (3)
CG 2DMARDIV (3)
*CG 3DMARDIV (3)
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CG 3DMAW (3)
*CG MARBAKS CAMPEN (3)
CG MARBAKS CAMLEJ (3)
CG FORTRPS FMFLANT (3)
*CG FMFPACTRPS (3)
*CG FORTRPS FMFPAC (3)
Dir MCEC MCS (3)
 CG MARCORCRUITDEPOT PARRIS ISLAND (3)
*CG MARCORCRUITDEPOT SAN DIEGO (3)
*COMARAIRRESTRACMd, NAS GLENVIEW, IIL (1)
*CG TTU PAC (1)
 CG TTU LANT (3)
 DivAvn (1)
 ACOPS, G-2 (1)
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* Via Air Mail



Enemy air forces were out in strength on only two days of the period. Inactivity on two and possibly three days can be attributed to weather. The reason for low activity on the remaining two days is unknown. The total number of sorties were 233, with 81 engagements. 8 destroyed and 6 demaged. This represents about half the errort of the previous week. On the night of 14 April a Mavy P-2V on an ECM mission in the Sea of Japan at latitude 43-07N, longitude 135-40E was picked up and followed by an unidentified aircraft. The P-2V continued on course 245 for approximately 170 miles with the unidentified aircraft staying approximately 12 miles astern. At this second position the unidentified aircraft was joined by a minimum total of 10 aircraft. The weather was CAVU, but the night was extremely dark. The P-2V headed for home base and descended to 400 feet altitude. The unidentified aircraft made at least 70 aggressive non-firing passes, mostly from astern, all passing underneath the P-2V at 400 feet. At least 10 passes were made by 4 planes in formation, with runs from astern. Radar emissions from one of the unidentified aircraft picked up by the P-2V indicate the possibility that one of the unidentified aircraft was using radar to position and control the other aircraft for their attacks. No recognition features of the unidentified aircraft were observed other than an occasional jet glow. This incident indicates an increased capability of Soviet interceptors.

Disposition and subordination of Communist combat aircraft in China and Manchuria are shown on the following chart. For the first 36 months of the Korean War Communist forces have made a continuing attempt to increase their defensive air capabilities. Since 1 October 1952, however, the trend changed when some 50 TU-2 conventional light bombers and 100 IL-28 light jet bombers appeared in the area. The Communists have indicated a definite desire to strike at UN air bases from which our air attacks are launched.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

	LOCATION			SUBORDINATION		
	CHINA	MAN	(a)	CCAF	NKAF	?
Fighters	40	500		120	80	40
Jet Fighters	400	1,000		925	75	400
Ground Attack	80	120	**************************************	160	40	
Bombers	200	40		240		ester esse
Jet Bombers	1000 6000	100	(★)	60	40	ngen deller
TOTAL:	720	1,460	.e.	1,505	235	440

GRAND TOTAL:

2180

It will be noted from the chart that the majority of the MIG-15 jet fighters are located in Manchuria and that all of the light jet bombers are located in Manchuria. In addition to the 2,180

